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3Multiple Rights and Interests in Land
This chapter presents a detailed analysis of land related institutions and rights,
with specific reference made to the following three points. First, land rights in
rural southern Ghana are held concurrently by multiple parties. For example,
the traditional divisional chief holds land as the custodian of the people.
Beneath him, citizens and their lineage members hold rights to actual use of
the land. Migrants who acquired land from a divisional chief also hold the
effective land use right. Moreover, tenants who enter into contracts with the
individuals have usufruct rights based on the content of the contracts. The
nature of these individual land rights, held by different people, are different
from the Western notion of individual land ownership that would completely
exclude other peoples’ control over the land. A piece of land can be bound
concurrently by multiple claims of various kinds held by different people.1
Second, the presence of concurrent land-right claims held by several people
means that there is diversity and flexibility in the degree of control that
individual farmers exert over the land. The strength of the control that a farmer
can exert over land depends on various factors, including the extent of the
control exerted by other parties, the methods of acquiring land rights, the
nature of the land rights (individual holding, lineage inheritance or usufruct
rights), the position of individuals in their families and communities, and their
contribution to farm labor. The interrelationship between these factors influence
an individual farmer’s control over land, and people constantly negotiate
claims to land.
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The third is the intertwining of claims to rights from three groups (wives,
children, and lineage members) when land is transferred through gifts and
inheritance. This situation leads both to the fragmentation of landholdings and
to the alienation of landholding rights from lineages. For instance, a farmer’s
wife and children expect to be gifted or inherit farmland in exchange for their
contributions to farm labor, while a farmer’s matrilineal kin also claim the
right to inherit the same land. To meet the multiple demands for gifts or
bequests, land is often divided into many portions and given to all parties
concerned. This subdivision process progresses with each generation, and the
spread of landholders tends to become more dispersed, rather than becoming
concentrated in specific individuals or lineages.
This chapter analyzes the land issues in cocoa-growing villages with refer-
ence to these three points. Section I looks at the contemporary situation of the
land tenure systems in the surveyed villages through an examination of their
relationship with customary land laws. Section II looks at the way claims to
land rights are intertwined and negotiated by different parties in these vil-
lages. Section III discusses the relationship between these situations and the
Land Title Registration Law of 1986. Finally, Section IV takes up the issue of
the fragmentation of land and the alienation of landholding rights.
I. Land Tenure Systems in the Surveyed Villages
1. Customary Land Laws
Under Ghanaian customary law, land rights have a three-tier structure
(Bentsi-Enchill 1964; Ollennu 1962). The first tier is the land rights held by
entire ethnic groups. Land controlled by ethnic groups is clearly demarcated,
and the land within each territory ultimately belongs to the people of the
ethnic group as a whole. The paramount chief as the head of the ethnic group
is the ultimate custodian of the land. In reality, however, several divisional
chiefs, under the paramount chief, are entrusted with the management of the
land within their territory and make decisions regarding land. The second tier
consists of the rights that individuals or lineages hold to actually utilize the
land and make decision about it. The third tier is the usufruct right obtained
through various agrarian contracts, as discussed in Chapter 2.
The ways of acquiring land rights at the second tier differ between “citi-
zens” (indigenous inhabitants) and “strangers” (migrants). When individuals
or lineages are indigenous inhabitants, they are entitled, by birth, to use the
land belonging to their communities free of any charge. Their rights to the
land can be handed over to their heirs on a quasi-permanent basis through
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gifts or inheritance. Outsiders who do not belong to the indigenous communes
have no such natural rights. These outsiders may acquire land rights by any of
three methods: (1) through acceptance as members of the commune; (2)
through gifts from indigenous inhabitants; and (3) through purchase. Land-
holding rights secured by outsiders through the second of these methods must
be returned to the giver when the outsider abandons the land or when there are
no successors.
Landholding rights acquired through the above methods can be transferred
to others through sale, gift and inheritance. However, these methods of trans-
fer are subject to the following procedures that apply under customary law.
When purchasing land rights, both parties must agree to the specific land
area and perform traditional ceremonies on that land to confirm the transfer of
the landholding rights. The preparation of a document that certifies the trans-
fer of landholding rights can substitute for this formality. The next step is to
make the sale of the land rights in question as public as possible. This can be
achieved by allowing witnesses, such as the relatives of both parties, to attend
the ceremonies.
Likewise, land gifting during the presenter’s lifetime also requires specific
procedures such as traditional ceremonies and an announcement of the gifting
of the land. Specifically, land gifting can be secured through the performance
of ceremonies during which the recipient of the land presents, in the presence
of witnesses, a gift (aseda) such as local gin, cattle, or cash as a mark of
appreciation to the original landholder.
Landholding rights may be transferred through inheritance, after the holder’s
death. When an individual dies intestate, his land is inherited and held by his
lineage. The inherited land is managed by the lineage head or someone se-
lected from among the lineage members. The earnings derived from the land
are used for the benefit of the lineage. As the landholding right belongs to the
entire lineage, it cannot be transferred to people outside the lineage at the
discretion of an individual.
A landholder can designate the inheritor of his land by oral will on his
deathbed. Inheritance of land rights by such a will should be performed in the
presence of kinsmen, and the inheritor must confirm the inheritance by pre-
senting local gin to the person who makes the will. In recent years, an oral will
has sometimes been replaced by a written will. However, the designation of
successors in such a will is limited to the land held by individuals. Lineage
land (abusua asase) cannot be transferred in the will of an individual.
Land acquired through purchase using one’s own funds can, in essence, be
transferred at the holder’s discretion, through sale, gift or bequest. However,
when such a transfer is directed to a person outside the lineage, the consent of
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the lineage is required and traditional ceremonies must be performed to confirm
the transfer in the presence of members of both lineages. The intent of such
ceremonies is to avoid possible disputes by announcing the transfer and al-
lowing the lineage members on the transferring side to confirm that the land in
question is not lineage land. Someone who makes use of lineage land cannot
decide on its transfer at his or her own discretion. Gift, inheritance, or sale of
lineage land to people outside that lineage requires the approval of the lineage
head and elders. Any transfer of land rights based solely on the decision of the
lineage head is regarded as invalid.
How are these customary land laws actually applied in the present-day
cocoa-growing villages? The following analysis of land tenure systems in the
surveyed villages clarifies the way in which individual farmers have acquired
land rights and the way multiple land claims are intertwined. The number of
landholding farmers from among those interviewed is shown in Table 3-1.
2. Land Rights in Bepoase
The land surrounding the village of Bepoase is part of the area traditionally
inhabited by the Sefwi people. All this land ultimately belongs to the Sefwi as
a whole under the custodianship of the paramount chief. However, the land is
actually managed by the Benkyemahene, the traditional divisional chief who
controls the area embracing the village of Bepoase.
In 1945 the area around Bepoase was entrusted by the Benkyemahene to
the paternal grandfather of the present village head. This entrustment was in
recognition of the outstanding educational work in the township of Sefwi by
this grandfather, who was a migrant from Akuapem. When other migrants,
mostly from Akuapem, wanted to acquire land rights near Bepoase, the grand-
father acted as an intermediary between them and the Benkyemahene. In
acquiring land rights, these migrants formed a group called the compani
(company). They acquired land rights with pooled funds. After that they
TABLE  3-1
NUMBER OF LANDHOLDERS BY SEX AND THEIR PERCENTAGES OF ALL FARMERS INTERVIEWED
Village
Male Female Total
N No. % N No. % N No. %
Bepoase 55 35 64 32 23 72 87 58 67
Nagore 90 40 44 62 41 66 152 81 53
Gyaha 128 46 36 107 26 24 235 72 31
Notes: 1. These figures include farmers using lineage land.
2. N = number of farmers interviewed.
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divided the land into individual strips for each individual share (Case 3-1 at
the end of this chapter).
Most of the present Bepoase residents are the descendants of the first-
generation migrants who acquired land rights from the Benkyemahene through
the above method. As shown in Table 3-2, many of the present day residents
obtained land rights through gifts or inheritance from their relatives. Some of
the first-generation migrants who had acquired land rights directly from the
Benkyemahene were still engaged in cocoa cultivation at the time of survey.
Although first-generation migrants paid money to the Benkyemahene for
the land rights, they did not purchase the land itself. Consequently, the final
decision-making rights over the land reside with the Benkyemahene. Indi-
vidual migrants can gift or bequeath their land rights to their relatives, but they
cannot sell them to people outside their kin group. This indicates that the
Benkyemahene’s control over the land is stronger than in the other surveyed
villages, as will be described in the following sections.
TABLE  3-2
METHODS AND SOURCES OF LAND ACQUISITIONS IN BEPOASE
Method Total No. Sex No. Sources and Cases of Acquisition
Male 30
Father 16; maternal uncle 4; maternal
grandfather, mother, maternal grand-
mother’s brother, 2 each; maternal
grandfather’s brother, wife’s father,
brother, paternal uncle, 1 each
Female 20 Husband 10, father 9, maternal grand-
mother 1
Male 9 Father 9
Female 3 Father 1, husband 1, sister 1
Male 3 Unrelated person 2, father 1
Female 3 Husband 1, unrelated person 2
Male 1 Paternal uncle 1
Female 0
Male 3 Father 3
Female 1 Father 1
Male 2 Benkyemahene 2
Female 0
Male 48 Father 30, maternal uncle 4, other 14
Female 27 Husband 12, father 11, other 4
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Inheritance 12
Gifts 50
Purchase 6
Yemayenkye 1
Lineage land 4
Obtained from chief 2
Total 75
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3. Land Rights in Nagore
The land around the village of Nagore is ultimately held by the Asantehene
(the paramount chief of the Asante) in trust for the Asante people. However, as
the land around Nagore comes under the jurisdiction of the Nyinahinhene (a
divisional chief), he is the actual manager of the land.
Nagore residents are divided into (1) indigenous Asante people who are the
citizen of Nyinahin, (2) Asante migrants who came from outside the jurisdic-
tion of the Nyinahinhene, and (3) migrants who are not Asante. Of these
residents, indigenous citizens of Nyinahin can, with the Nyinahinhene’s ap-
proval, develop the uncultivated land free of charge and transfer land right to
their heirs through gifts or inheritance (Case 3-2). In Nagore there were six
such cases of the acquisition of land rights by the citizens of Nyinahin (Table
3-3).
Free usufruct right over land is not granted to migrants from elsewhere.
When outsiders want to acquire undeveloped land within the jurisdiction of
the Nyinahinhene, they have to make monetary payments to the Nyinahinhene
and confirm their acquisition of land rights through the customary presenta-
tion of aseda, or “thanks” (usually a bottle of local gin). The land rights
obtained in this way can be transferred to anybody at the discretion of the
landholders. This seems to indicate that, in Nagore, the divisional chief’s
control over land is weaker than that in Bepoase.
Seventeen people who acquired uncultivated land directly from the
Nyinahinhene were still alive at the time of the survey. Sixteen of them had
acquired land in the 1950s. This suggests that in the areas around the village
of Nagore, where cocoa production started in the first half of the 1950s, the
acquisition of uncultivated land by migrants and Nyinahin citizens progressed
rapidly in the following decade, and that there was little uncultivated land left
by the start of the 1960s. As a result, in later years land was acquired mostly
through sales or yemayenkye contracts, or through gifts or inheritance from
individuals who had already obtained land.
In Bepoase, transfer of land rights to people outside the lineage (through
sale or yemayenkye contract) was strictly prohibited by the Benkyemahene,
while land was actually “sold” in Nagore (Table 3-3). In the case of purchas-
ing land rights from individuals in Nagore, the transfer of landholding rights
was confirmed by the performance of traditional ceremonies and the presenta-
tion of gin in the presence of kinsmen from both parties. Sometimes written
certificates of land sales are prepared to avoid future disputes over the land-
holding rights (Case 3-3).
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4. Land Rights in Gyaha
The area around the village of Gyaha borders on two areas traditionally
managed by the paramount chiefs of Akyem Kotoku and Akyem Abuakwa.
The western part of areas surrounding Gyaha is within the territory managed
by the Abenasehene, who is under the paramount chief of Akyem Kotoku. The
eastern part lies within the territory managed by the Okumaninghene, who is
under the paramount chief of Akyem Abuakwa.
A group of six people who came to acquire land for farming during the first
decade of the 1900s were the first to settle in the area around Gyaha. They
TABLE  3-3
METHODS AND SOURCES OF LAND ACQUISITIONS IN NAGORE
Method Total No. Sex No. Sources and Cases of Acquisition
Male 16
Father 7; maternal uncle 2; mother’s ma-
ternal uncle 3; paternal grandfather,
mother, wife’s brother, Nyinahinhene, 1
each
Female 33
Husband 12; father 10; mother 3; maternal
uncle 2; Nyinahinhene, son, paternal aunt,
maternal grandfather, maternal grand-
mother, mother’s maternal uncle, 1 each
Male 5 Maternal uncle 3, mother 1, wife’s pater-
nal uncle 1
Female 4 Mother 3, husband 1
Male 16 Nyinahinhene 8, unrelated person 8
Female 7 Unrelated person 5, Nyinahinhene 1, un-known 1
Male 2 Unrelated person 2
Female 1 Unrelated person 1
Male 5 Nyinahinhene 4, othera 1
Female 2 Nyinahinhene 2
Male 44
Nyinahinhene 13, unrelated person 10, fa-
ther 7, maternal uncle 5, mother’s ma-
ternal uncle 3, mother 2, other 4
Female 47
Husband 13; father 10; mother 6; unrelated
person 6; Nyinahinhene 4; maternal
uncle 2; other 6
a Using land managed by the Nkawie chief adjacent to land managed by the Nyinahinhene.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Citizen’s right 7
Total 91
Inheritance 9
Gifts 49
Purchase 23
Yemayenkye 3
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jointly purchased land in the eastern part of Abenase from the chief of Abenase,
dividing it into proportionate shares. The area around the village of Gyaha is
the share of the land that was held by the maternal uncle of the present Gyaha
village head. The maternal uncle came from Anum and died in 1947. Migrants
who came later to the area bought land either from the initial six people, or
directly from the Abenasehene or the Okumaninghene.
At the time of surveys, there was no survivor from among the first-genera-
tion migrants. The present Gyaha villagers are descendants of the first-genera-
tion migrants, migrants who came later and bought land from the first-genera-
tion, and tenants who engage in cocoa production under tenancy contracts.
Gyaha villagers are composed of a relatively small number of owner-
cultivators and a large number of tenants. Many of the cocoa farmers in the
villages of Bepoase and Nagore are either first-generation owner-cultivators
who have acquired land directly from the chief, or second-generation owner-
TABLE  3-4
METHODS AND SOURCES OF LAND ACQUISITIONS IN GYAHA
Method Total No. Sex No. Sources and Cases of Acquisition
Male 16
Father 9; maternal uncle 4; father’s sisters’
child, paternal uncle, maternal grandfa-
ther, 1 each
Female 12 Husband 9, father 2, brother 1
Male 9 Father 4, maternal uncle 3, maternal grand-father 1, paternal uncle 1
Female 6 Father 2, husband 2, maternal uncle 2
Male 9 Unrelated person 4, village head 2, father,brother, Okumaninghene, 1 each
Female 0
Male 6 Unrelated person 6
Female 2 Unrelated person 2
Male 9
Father 5; paternal grandfather 2; paternal
great-grandfather, mother’s maternal
uncle, 1 each
Female 7
Father 3; mother’s maternal uncle, mater-
nal uncle, brother’s maternal uncle, pa-
ternal grandfather, 1 each
Male 49 Father 19, maternal uncle 7, unrelated per-
son 10, other 13
Female 27 Husband 11, father 8, maternal uncle 3, un-
related person 2, other 3
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Inheritance 15
Gifts 28
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Yemayenkye 8
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cultivators who use land taken over from the first-generation farmers. In
contrast, many cocoa farmers in Gyaha are tenants who engage in cocoa
cultivation under various contracts with absentee landlords. Some of them
are second-generation tenants who inherited their contracts from their rela-
tives.
In recent years there have been only a few cases of land purchased in the
area around the village of Gyaha. The surveys found that out of nine cases of
land purchased in Gyaha, only one case has occurred since the 1980s. (Table
3-4 present the methods and sources of land acquisitions in Gyaha.) With the
exception of the village head, no other farmer has sold land. When buying
land from others it is customary to perform the traditional ceremonies and
present sheep and local gin in the presence of the village head and witnesses
from both sides. An additional normal procedure is the preparation of docu-
ments to certify land sales, to be signed by witnesses. This formality is in-
tended to prevent possible future disputes over land, but even when this step is
taken, disputes can still sometimes arise (Case 3-4).
II. Multiplicity of Rights and Farmers’ Strategies
The dominant characteristic of the land rights seen in each of the three survey
villages is the existence of concurrent claims to land from multiple parties.
This element will be discussed from two perspectives: (1) land right claims in
the case of gifting and inheritance; and (2) the relationship of land rights
between lineages and individuals. From these perspectives, this section ana-
lyzes the strategies adopted by farmers to expand and safeguard their land
rights.
1. Gift and Inheritance
The Asante people, who make up 80 per cent of Nagore’s population,
follow a matrilineal inheritance system. In Nagore, however, examples of land
acquired through mother’s kin account for only 35 per cent of all cases of
acquisition through gifts and inheritance, while those through paternal lines
account for 33 per cent. In the latter cases, father-to-children transfers are the
most frequent. Husband-to-wife transfers are also quite frequent accounting
for 23 per cent. Despite the prevailing matrilineal system in Nagore, transfers
of land rights from father to son and from husband to wife actually coexist
with matrilineal inheritance.
One reason for the coexistence of matrilineal inheritance with other land
transfer patterns is the fact that, in migrant communities, wives and children
contribute more labor for farming than do matrilineal kin. As has often been
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pointed out in earlier studies, conjugal ties are stronger in migrant communi-
ties than in indigenous communities. As a result, wives and children tend to
have stronger claims to the cocoa farms they have cultivated. The result is the
coexistence of claims to land rights from wives and children on the basis of
their contribution to farm development and claims from matrilineal kin on the
basis of the traditional custom of matrilineal inheritance. Such multiple claims
to the same land tend to cause frequent disputes over land gifts and inherit-
ance between the landholder’s matrilineal kin on the one hand and the
landholder’s wife and children on the other. These disputes often occur when
the father wants to transfer land to his children, as shown in the following
cases.
Case: Disputes between children and matrilineal kin over father’s land (1).
Around 1985 the father of Akua, a fifty-six-year-old woman in Nagore, de-
cided to let his daughter Akua and his niece (a matrilineal kin) inherit and
divide his land after his death. However, the father’s matrilineal relatives
opposed Akua’s inheritance of part of the land. The dispute was taken to court.
The court decided to let Akua inherit part of the land, and Akua confirmed the
transfer of land rights from her father by making a ceremonial presentation of
gin to her father. After her father’s death in 1991, however, the niece hid the
document that certified the sharing of the land, thereby preventing Akua from
confirming the demarcation of her share of the land.
Case: Dispute between children and matrilineal kin over father’s land (2).
In 1995 Afia, a thirty-three-year old woman in Nagore, received land from her
father together with the father’s nephew and niece. On that occasion Afia
confirmed the gift in the presence of her father’s matrilineal kin by performing
the ceremony of presenting local gin. However, when her father died that year,
his matrilineal kin insisted that they were entitled to the land that had been
gifted to Afia, and the dispute was taken to court. Afia and her father had
prepared no document to certify the gift.
What characterizes these two cases is that the disputes occurred even though
the ceremony confirming the land transfer had taken place in the presence of
the parties concerned in accordance with the customary land law. To avoid
such disputes, a landholder often prepares his will while alive (Case 3-5 at the
end of this chapter). Nevertheless, such disputes often occur between the
landholder’s wife or children and his matrilineal kin.
Disputes between landholders’ matrilineal relatives and his wives and chil-
dren over gifts and inheritance of property are becoming an important issue in
Ghana. This reflects the increasing importance of the nuclear family as a
social unit. Because of this growing importance, the government established a
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new law of succession in 1985 (Interstate Succession Law, 1985). This law
stipulates that, when a person dies intestate, the spouse is entitled to 3/16 of
the personal property of the deceased and the children to 9/16. In other words,
the law guarantees a greater share of property to nuclear family members than
to matrilineal group member.
Consequently, the present situation regarding gifts and inheritance of land
is influenced by several factors such as: (a) claims to land rights from the
matrilineal kin on the basis of matrilineal inheritance; (b) claims to land rights
from wives and children based on their actual contribution to farm labor; and
(c) government policy that attaches importance to the nuclear family regard-
ing succession. As a result, there are many uncertainties and the possibility of
future disputes about gifts and inheritance of land not only in Nagore but also
in other villages. This ambiguity is reflected in the following contrasting
views held by two farmers.
Case: Children expecting to acquire land from their father (1). James, who
is thirty-one years old, and his three brothers have developed and are manag-
ing a cocoa farm on his father’s land in Nagore. Knowing that the government
policy is to encourage patrilineal rather than matrilineal inheritance, he is
convinced that the cocoa farm they developed will become his and his broth-
ers’ possession after his father’s death, rather than reverting to his father’s
matrilineal kin. Yet this has not been promised by their father.
Case: Children expecting to acquire land from their father (2). While
engaged in sharecropping on his father’s cocoa farm, Kwabena, an eighteen-
year-old man in Nagore cultivated land held by his father and also planted
cocoa there in 1993. He hopes that the cocoa farm he has developed will be
transferred to him in the future. He is afraid, however, that this possibility will
diminish if his father dies without leaving a written will.
Claims to land rights from several quarters at the time of the gifting or
inheritance can also be seen in Gyaha. Ethnic groups in Gyaha such as the
Anum, Boso, and Fante traditionally follow the matrilineal inheritance sys-
tem. However, as is the case with the matrilineal Asante in Nagore, there is a
practice among these matrilineal groups, of gifting and inheriting land from
father to children or from husband to wife (Table 3-5). In some cases, inherit-
ance occurs in both matrilineal and patrilineal directions (Case 3-6). Also,
land can be divided and inherited by wives, children and matrilineal kin, as is
seen in the following example.
Case: Concurrent succession of land to wife, children, and matrilineal kin.
A maternal uncle of Yaa, a forty-year-old Fante woman, died in 1986 without
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a will. Upon consultation with the uncle’s matrilineal kin, it was decided to let
his land be inherited by his wife, his three sons, and his niece Yaa (Figure 3-1).
These five people had contributed labor to his cocoa farm.
This case may be regarded as a concessionary solution when there are
multiple claims to land rights. In migrant communities such as Gyaha, cocoa
farms are often developed and maintained using the labor of a nuclear family
(male family head, his wife and his children). Consequently, even among
people under the traditional matrilineal inheritance system, labor contribu-
tions to agricultural production are primarily from nuclear families centered
on conjugal relationships.
On the other hand, the traditional heirs of a migrant farmer under the
matrilineal inheritance system are his sisters’ offspring. They, however, do not
usually live in the same village with the farmer, and thus contribute little labor
to the development of cocoa farms. In such cases, the farmer is more inclined
to give land to wives and children who are engaged in daily farm work or who
develop cocoa farms by themselves on the land, rather than to the traditional
heirs who have little daily involvement in the farm.
Even when a landholder dies intestate, the claims to the deceased’s land
from his wife and children cannot be ignored in deciding on the land succes-
sion. In such cases, potential disputes may be avoided through a form of
TABLE  3-5
SOURCES OF LAND ACQUISITIONS THROUGH GIFTS OR INHERITANCE: GYAHA
(No. of cases)
Matrilineal: Anum/Boso 2 5 4 1 3 15
Fante 4 1 1 1 0 7
Kwahu 2 0 0 0 0 2
Akuapem (Aburi) 1 1 0 0 0 2
Total 9 7 5 2 3 26
Patrilineal: Akuapem (Larteh, etc.) 1 0 10 0 1 12
Krobo 1 0 2 0 0 3
Total 2 0 12 0 1 15
Grand total 11 7 17 2 4 41
Note: Gift or inheritance from the same person, even in different years, is counted as
one case.
Sources of Acquisitions
Maternal
Grand-
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concession that satisfies land right claims from both matrilineal groups and
from wives and children. The solution is to divide the land among the “tradi-
tional” heirs such as sisters’ offspring as well as among wives and children
who make the greatest contribution to daily farming.
The arrangements for gifts and inheritance of land are not always so strict
as is stipulated in the traditional inheritance system. They often depend on
individual circumstances and claims to land rights from multiple quarters. Yet
“peaceful” concessions are not always reached between matrilineal relatives
and wives and children. As the Nagore examples show, there can be confron-
tations and disputes between both parties.
2. Lineage and Individual Land Rights
When a landholder dies intestate, the land is sometimes held as lineage land
instead of being taken over by individuals. Whether the land is divided among
individuals, or whether it is managed as lineage land, is a decision based on
consultation within the lineage. When the holdings are controlled as lineage
land, the head of the lineage takes responsibility for the land. At times, when
the lineage head lives elsewhere, an elder among those engaged in farming on
the land is placed in charge of the land. Lineage members have the right to
cultivate undeveloped land, if any, within the common holdings. The common
holdings cannot be sold at individual discretion.
Fig. 3-1
=
Husband Wife
Died in 1986
Matrilineal line
Patrilineal line
= direction of land inheritance.
= dead.
Yaa
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It is often not clear whether a land is individually held or is allocated to an
individual while it remains as lineage property. In the surveyed villages, there
are some farmers who insist that they have divided up the common holdings
of their relatives into personal holdings.
Case: Lineage common holdings divided among brothers. The father of
Kwaku, a sixty-year-old man in Gyaha who is a Larteh which follows partilinial
inheritance, purchased land from the Abenasehene and let a tenant cultivate
the land under a yemayenkye contract. After he died in 1946, his children
became landlords and continued the contract. In 1983 the cocoa farm devel-
oped under the contract was divided equally between the landlords and tenant.
After that the children (six male and four female children from different
mothers) divided the landlords’ share of the land into ten pieces to secure their
respective holdings.
In the above case Kwaku considers his share of land as personal property,
but there is the possibility that the land in fact remains as lineage land and
Kwaku only has use right of his share. Therefore, if Kwaku wants to sell his
share of the land, lineage members who consider the land as lineage property
may raise objections. Also, in some cases (Case 3-7 at the end of this chapter),
an individual would sell lineage land on his/her own initiative. Accordingly,
lineage land carries risks arising from the confusion about land rights because
of the unclear distinction between lineage and individual holdings, as well as
the possibility of expansionary use of individual rights over lineage land by
some lineage members.
The above discussion of the present land system points out the coexistence
of multiple rights of different parties over the same land. In the gifting or
inheriting of land, for instance, claims to rights from wives and children who
have contributed labor on the farm are often intertwined with claims from
matrilineal kin. The agreement of the lineage head and elders is required when
an individual’s land is sold, is transferred through division under the yemayenkye
contract, or is passed on through gifts or bequests to someone outside the
lineage. This fact proves that it is not only landholding individuals but also
members of their lineage that have rights over the land. Because multiple
parties have concurrent rights over a piece of land, the transfer of land rights
takes place not just between individuals but also in the context of the multiple
claims made by different parties.
In this way, multiple parties have different concurrent rights over the same
land and each party exercise different levels of control over the land. The
degree of someone’s control over the land depends heavily on the extent of the
control exercised by the other parties involved with that land. As a result, a
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range of factors affect both the security of future individual land rights and the
maintenance of control over land already acquired. It is these uncertainties
that generate the various land disputes mentioned earlier.
3. Farmer Strategies to Reinforce Land Rights
Land rights uncertainties prompt some farmers to attempt to secure their
rights through the preparation of official documents. The documents for such
purposes include written wills on succession arrangements, papers certifying
the sale or gifting of land, written contracts confirming the yemayenkye ar-
rangements, and maps showing holdings that are prepared by the government’s
licensed surveyors. These documents are usually prepared by government-
licensed notaries and signed not only by the parties concerned, but also by
representatives of lineage members, and sometimes even by divisional chiefs.
The existence of multiple signatories suggests that there are multiple claims
over the land, and that confirmation of the transfer of land requires the ap-
proval of all these signatories.
An important strategy adopted by farmers to enhance their control over
certain land is to establish a demonstrable result through continuing labor
input into that land. Specifically, this means the development and mainte-
nance of a farm through the investment of one’s own labor and capital. The
best way to do this is to maintain a farm over a long period of time and to plant
cocoa trees to make sure of an ongoing harvest. When a farmer develops a
cocoa farm on someone’s land with the landholder’s agreement, the land-
holder retains the landholding right but the actual developer of the farm has a
strong control over the cocoa trees and harvest. As a separation between
management of the land and the management of cocoa trees is impossible in
reality, the developer of a cocoa farm can enhance his right to the land by
planting cocoa trees and maintaining the farm. Similarly, when an indigenous
inhabitant engages in farming using uncultivated land with the permission of
the divisional chief, the farmer can constrain other resident’s latent rights and
enhance his own control over the land by continuously cultivating the land by,
for example, developing a cocoa farm. This method of reinforcing land rights
by establishing a demonstrable result can also apply where a lineage member
engages in the cultivation of land held jointly by the lineage. In a similar vein,
under the yemayenkye contract, the tenant can be sure of a long-term stable
usufructuary right to the land as long as he maintains the cocoa farm in good
condition (Chapter 2). In this way, an individual can enhance the security of
his right to the land by developing and maintaining the farm through the
injection of his labor and capital.
The development of a cocoa farm, a demonstrable result of one’s capital
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and labor input, is helpful not only in confirming present land rights but also
in enhancing the possibility of future land acquisition. This can be seen in the
case where a wife plants cocoa on part of the land of her husband’s food farm.
If she is allowed by her husband to produce only food crops, the production of
food crops will end in a year or two and she has no entitlement to long-term
rights over that land. In contrast, if the wife develops a cocoa farm on her
husband’s land through her own efforts and capital, she is then guaranteed the
harvest from the farm as well as long-term use of the land. In other words, the
husband’s approval of his wife’s cultivation of cocoa means that he has given
permission for the wife’s long-term use of the land. In this way, a wife can
reinforce her rights over the cocoa farm she has cultivated as well as over the
land itself, and thereby greatly increase the possibility that her husband will
gift or bequeath the land to her in the future (Chapter 4). This process can also
apply when a son independently develops a cocoa farm on his father’s land.
The development of a cocoa farm on land held by a husband or father is a way
of enhancing one’s future bargaining power with respect to future gifts or
bequests of land.
The foregoing discussion is indicative of the diversity of the nature of land
rights and the ways in which they can be acquired in the surveyed villages. As
was stated at the outset, two points have been verified. First, there are concur-
rent claims to land from multiple parties, and this has influenced the extent to
which farmers can exercise rights over land. The degree of individual control
over land is highly flexible, constantly expanding and diminishing, and is also
dependent on interactions with demands from others who hold latent rights
(Okoth-Ogendo 1989, p. 12). Second, farmers are trying to increase their
control over land by adopting such strategies as preparing official documents
or creating and maintaining a demonstrable result of accomplishment on the
land. Investing their own capital and labor and developing cocoa farms on the
land are the important means for farmers to expand their claims to and control
over land (Sjaastad and Bromley 1997; Besley 1995; Bruce 1988; Place and
Otsuka 1998).
III. Indigenous Land Tenure Systems and the Land Title Regis-
tration Law, 1986
Ghana enacted its Land Title Registration Law in 1986. Its application is
nation-wide and it has two objectives: “first, to give certainty and facilitate the
proof of title; secondly, to render dealings in land safe, simple and cheap and
prevent frauds on purchasers and mortgagees.” (Land Title Registration Law,
1986; Memorandum, p. i)
51MULTIPLE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN LAND
The background for the establishment of this law includes, as the law notes,
two considerations—the frequent occurrences of litigation regarding land and
the problems associated with agricultural tenancies and credit facilities. The
law begins by commenting on these points: “[t]hese uncertainties act as a
brake on the commercial and agricultural development of the country.” (Land
Title Registration Law, 1986; Memorandum, p. iv) The law refers also to the
share contracts practiced extensively in Ghana as follows: “It has long been
recognized that the abunu, abusa and other share-cropping arrangements are
often unfair and inequitable. Registration will protect these tenants by giving
them reasonable security to devote time, labor or capital to the improvements
or productivity of their lands. . . . ” (Land Title Registration Law, 1986; Memo-
randum, Part II, pp. v–vi).
Objectives of the Land Title Registration Law were to provide certainty
over land rights through the registration of title, to protect tenants who were in
a weaker position in regard to land rights, and to facilitate agricultural invest-
ment and promote agricultural development.2
The establishment of this law was influenced by two major global trends.
The first has been the implementation of structural adjustment programs since
1983. Under the programs, which have liberalized the economy and empha-
sized on economic development led by the private sector, the government’s
key role has been to induce direct investment from abroad and guarantee
economic activity by domestic entrepreneurs. In essence, the intent of the
Land Title Registration Law has been to give certainty to investor land rights
through nationwide implementation of land registration and to establish an
environment for agricultural and industrial development through private sec-
tor initiatives (Amanor 1999, pp. 61–62).
Secondly, the basic idea of the law was influenced by international com-
mentaries suggesting that the indigenous land tenure system based on com-
munal landholdings impeded agricultural development in Africa. This argu-
ment is based on the assumption that individual land rights have yet to be
established in Africa, and that without the establishment of individual land
rights, agricultural development is hampered in three ways. First, the transfer
of land rights is prevented and efficient allocation of land is inhibited. Second,
communal landholding impedes the development of an agricultural credit
market because land cannot be used as collateral. Third, uncertain individual
land rights reduce farmers’ incentives to invest in land, thus impeding produc-
tion increase. By the mid-1980s this argument was refined by the neo-classi-
cal school of economics and the evolutionary theory of land rights, and was
reflected in the land policies of both African and donor countries.3 The influence
of this approach, which become prominent in international development circles,
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is contained in Ghana’s Land Title Registration Law.
Can the Land Title Registration Law, with its basis in neoliberal economic
thinking, provide individual farmers with the intended security to their land
rights? Can it enhance the production incentives of farmers and lead to the
development of the basic conditions indispensable for agricultural develop-
ment? As will be seen in the discussion that follows, the basic premises that
led to the establishment of the law contain several problems.
1. Investment Incentives and Land Rights
The first problem is the premise that investment incentives for farmers are
inadequate when land rights are uncertain under the indigenous land tenure
system. In the Ghanaian context, however, rather than being a disincentive,
this uncertainty has tended to push farmers to invest and produce tree crops
such as cocoa in order to improve the security of their land rights.
Given that the degree of an individual’s control over land constantly changes
because of the various factors that have already been discussed, Ghanaian
farmers take various measures to enhance their control over the land in accor-
dance with their respective circumstances. One such strategy is the establish-
ment of demonstrable result on the land through the investment of labor and
capital. One of the best ways of doing this is to plant cocoa trees that will
continue to yield crops for about forty years, and to maintain the farm in good
condition. A farmer can secure his land right by maintaining and controlling
the cocoa farm and by constraining potential land rights claims made by
others.
In addition, farmers using such strategies appear to be trying to enhance
their bargaining power in the acquisition of land in the future. In the most
typical example of this strategy, sons or wives try to accumulate evidence of
their labor and capital investment into the cocoa farm established on their
fathers’ or husbands’ land, which they expect to acquire through gifts or
bequests in the future. Similarly, a yemayenkye tenant can secure long-term
stable rights to land if he proves to be an able manager of a cocoa farm. By
maintaining the cocoa farm in good condition, he can also increase the possi-
bility of acquiring land from the landlord in the future through the land-
dividing yemayenkye contract.
All these examples indicate that, given the present situation in Ghana where
multiple parties have concurrent claims of rights to the same land, individual
farmers adopt strategies that reinforce their control over that land. They do so
by establishing a cocoa farm as an accomplished fact through an investment of
labor and capital, and by maintaining that farm in good condition. Their labor
and capital investment into the land, and the cocoa farm they established by
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their own effort, strengthens their claims to the land and their future bargain-
ing power. It is not that farmers refrain from investment because their land
rights are uncertain. Rather they have incentives to invest in land because of
their uncertain land rights. (Sjaastad and Bromley 1997; Besley 1995; Bruce
1988; Place and Otsuka 1998). The premise that land registration would bring
certainty to land rights and encourage investment by farmers is a simplistic
one that overlooks the complexity of the existing incentive structures.
2. Land Registration and Rural Power Structures
Another problem with the argument for land registration is that such regis-
tration, when implemented, would add to the uncertainty affecting those with
weak landholding rights, such as tenants and women. In an African country
characterized by an uneven distribution of economic and political power
among people, land registration may reinforce the existing sharp disparities
between the powerful and powerless. Rather than protecting the land rights of
the powerless such as tenants and women farmers, land registration would
result in further destabilization of land rights of the less powerful groups
(Havnevik 1997; Cornia 1994; Lastarria-Cornhiel 1997).
As has been noted, in rural Ghana there are concurrent claims to a piece of
land, and individual land rights are constantly negotiated. The strength of
individual claims to land and the power relationships between the parties
concerned constantly change. But land registration does not allow such flexible
and negotiable land right. If introduced to the situation where land rights are
multiple and variable, land registration would lock in the land rights position
applicable at a certain time, and would most probably confirm the rights of
those with the strongest claims to the land. In many cases those who have
“legitimate” land rights necessary for formal registration are male lineage
heads, husbands, landlords and politically and economically influential per-
sons with close relationships with government organizations. Therefore land
registration is most likely to increase the power of those who already hold
strong land rights.
Under the present situation in Ghana, land rights are sufficiently flexible to
change to reflect years of individual effort and negotiations between the par-
ties concerned. The flexible and negotiable nature of land rights allow land-
less tenants and female farmers to gradually expand their control over land
through many years of investment and efforts so that they finally become
landholders. The registration of land, however, does not tolerate such a flexible
system. There is little possibility that a land registrar will take full account of
the rights of the tenants and female farmers who have been endeavoring to
strengthening their land rights through continuous labor and capital invest-
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ment in the farmland to win landholding rights in the future. In addition, it is
these people who will have the least information about registration when
implemented. As such, they may not be able to submit proper evidence to
support their land rights for registration purposes. They are mostly illiterate
but will have to fill in complex documents and pay fees that impose heavy
burdens on them. Disadvantaged by these conditions, and with little incen-
tives to seek registration, these people’s claims to land are unlikely to be
reflected in the land registration process. Consequently, the implementation of
land registration is likely to result in providing a legal guarantee only to the
people with the strongest land rights, thus strengthening the present uneven
power relationships among the rural population (Baland and Platteau 1998;
Kasanga 1996).
IV. Fragmentation of Land
In southern Ghana there was a rapid increase in the acquisition of uncultivated
land by migrant cocoa farmers after 1900. The most frequent land acquisitions
took place after 1900 in Gyaha and about 1950 in Bepoase and Nagore. Hill
(1963) wrote an excellent monograph about the situation of the cocoa-produc-
ing villages in the early stages of migration when the cocoa production areas
expanded rapidly. She described the process of the expansion as highly capi-
talistic because migrant farmers reinvested their earnings from cocoa farms
into the acquisition of new land. In the 1990s, however, the state of landhold-
ing appeared to be moving in the opposite direction of land accumulation. My
survey revealed that there seems to be a process of landholding fragmentation
as well as the dispersion of land rights through transfers to people outside the
original landholders’ lineages. Underlying these changes were factors such as
(1) the decrease in uncultivated land available for acquisition by individuals,
(2) fragmentation and dispersion of land through gifts and inheritance, and (3)
an increasing number of yemayenkye contracts and the resultant distribution
of land to landless people.
In the early stages of rapidly increasing cocoa production, uncultivated
land was abundant in southern Ghana and migrants could acquire land from
the chiefs with relative ease. Land accumulation by “capitalist” farmers in the
earlier years was possible because of this availability of uncultivated land.
After about 1940 the acquisition of land by migrant farmers spread to western
Ghana where uncultivated land was relatively plentiful. As a result, by the
1960s and 1970s, uncultivated land in this part of Ghana had almost entirely
disappeared. In the three surveyed villages, ten out of twelve cases of acquisi-
tion from divisional chiefs had occurred before 1960 (Table 3-6). Subsequent
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land acquisitions were not from divisional chiefs but mainly through gifts and
inheritance. There were few cases of land sales because land is considered to
be an important property that can be passed on to descendants, and people are
generally hesitant about land sales. When the acquisition of uncultivated land
from chiefs became increasingly difficult, individual farmers also became
more hesitant about selling their land, thereby making it harder for certain
groups of people to accumulate land through purchase.
On the other hand, the transfer of land to multiple parties through gifts and
inheritance prompted land fragmentation. As was discussed in the foregoing
section, claims to land come from many parties, including wives and children
who contribute to farm labor and the members of matrilineal kin groups. To
meet these multiple demands, land tends to be divided and given to the
individuals concerned at the time of gifting and inheritance. Consequently,
with each generation, the individual shares of land became smaller. In the
village of Gyaha, for example, instances of land shared by more than three
people at the time of gifting or inheritance accounted for 60 per cent of the
total (fifteen out of twenty-five cases), and in 12 per cent of the cases, land was
divided and shared by more than ten people. This trend toward the multiple
division of land is observed with both matrilineal and patrilineal inheritance,
especially when relatives confer to decide on succession after a landholder
dies. Considerations of multiple claims to land from different parties, includ-
ing the landholder’s wife, children, and sisters’ offspring lie behind land
fragmentation at the time of transfer.
This phenomenon represents not only the process of fragmentation that
reduces the acreage of individual landholding, but also the process of land
rights distribution to individuals who belong to other lineages. Lineage mem-
bers of a landholder exercise certain claims to his individual holdings, but
wives and children who under matrilineal systems belong to a different lin-
eage from the landholder also exercise claims to the same land. The result
may be the division and distribution of the land to all parties concerned. In this
TABLE  3-6
YEARS OF LAND ACQUISITIONS FROM CHIEFS AND INDIVIDUALS (THREE-VILLAGE TOTAL)
(No. of cases)
–1939 1940–49 1950–59 1960–69 1970–79 1980–89 1990–
Obtained from chief  0 0 10 2 0 0 0
Land purchase from
individualsa 1 0 0 4 9 8 4
a There are two more cases of unknown years of acquisition.
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way the process of fragmentation of individual holdings is taking place simul-
taneously with the process of land transfer to people outside the landholding
lineages.
Fragmentation of land and the dispersion of land rights to people outside
the landholding lineages have also been prompted by the land-dividing
yemayenkye contract. The time when this form of contract was increasingly
adopted varied between study villages. In Bepoase and Nagore, where the first
migrants began to settle around 1950, most cases of yemayenkye began in the
1980s, while in Gyaha, where the first migrants settled in the early twentieth
century, the number of yemayenkye contracts increased from the 1960s. These
facts seems to indicate that the yemayenkye developed as a new way of
acquiring land rights after most uncultivated land had been occupied and little
land remained available from the divisional chief. On the other hand, in the
twenty to forty years after the opening of the villages, some of the first-
generation migrant farmers became old and wanted more effective use of
unused land or obsolete cocoa farms. This increased the supply of land avail-
able for yemayenkye contracts. In this way, in about twenty to forty years after
the opening of the migrant cocoa-farming villages, both demand and supply
side requirements appeared to coincide, encouraging the use of yemayenkye
contracts. The actual division of land between landlord and tenant under
yemayenkye takes place ten to thirty years after the beginning of the contract.
Therefore, the process of land transfer from landlord to tenant is very slow.
Yet widespread use of this contract brings about a slow but steady flow of land
from landholders to landless people. It also contributes to a process of dis-
persal of land rights to people outside the original landholders’ lineages.
All this suggests that the days when large-scale land acquisition and capi-
talist land accumulation by migrants were possible have passed, along with
the existence of plentiful supplies of uncultivated land. In the cocoa-produc-
ing villages of today, available uncultivated land has disappeared as a result of
the rapid expansion of cocoa-producing areas. On the other hand, there have
been numerous land transfers to different heirs, both within and outside the
landholders’ lineages through gifts and inheritance, as well as to landless
people through the yemayenkye contract. The interaction of these factors has
led to a gradual progress of fragmentation of landholding and dispersal of
landholding rights to people outside the original landholders’ lineages.
The present situation suggests that landholding in Ghana’s cocoa-growing
areas is leading not to a bipolar division between a land accumulating class
and a landless class, but to averaging and the fragmentation of landholdings.
Alongside this situation, pressure on the land is growing with the increasing
population, while newly available land for cocoa production is becoming
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increasingly scarce. As a result, the acreage of land that can be controlled by
individual farmers and lineages is being reduced.
Conclusion
This chapter has analyzed land issues associated with cocoa production. In the
first section it reviewed the land tenure systems in the surveyed villages based
on the customary land law in Ghana. The second section analyzed the charac-
teristics of these systems. This analysis revealed the diversity of land rights,
the concurrent claims to the same land by multiple parties, and the various
measures taken by farmers to strengthen their control over their land. Section
III analyzed the relationship between the indigenous land tenure systems and
the Land Title Registration Law of 1986. In this section it was noted that, even
though land rights may be uncertain, farmers do not always refrain from
investment as is presupposed by the Land Title Registration Law. It was also
argued that the implementation of this law is likely to reinforce the existing
power relationships in rural areas. Section IV raises the possibility that land-
holding in cocoa-growing villages in Ghana is moving toward averaging and
downsizing through the fragmentation of land and dispersal of landholding
rights to non-lineage members. The following factors have been noted as
contributory causes of this fragmentation and dispersal: the increasing difficulty
of acquiring uncultivated land directly from divisional chiefs; people’s reluc-
tance of selling their land; the trend toward land division through gifts and
inheritance; and the transfer of land to landless people through the land-
dividing yemayenkye contract. It was also noted that this process of fragmen-
tation and dispersal is associated with the progression in the generations of
migrant cocoa farmers.
The aforementioned situation in present-day cocoa-producing villages in
Ghana is different from the observation made by earlier studies that a rural
capitalist class was forming through the seizure of economic opportunities to
accumulate land. Because of the decrease of unoccupied land available from
the chiefs and the pressure of a growing population, the potential for indi-
vidual farmers to expand their farm acreage is diminishing. On the other hand,
fragmentation of land and the dispersal of landholding rights are under way as
part of the process mentioned in Section IV. With the progression of cocoa
farmers from one generation to another, individual landholdings are becom-
ing smaller, and land rights are gradually being dispersed to people outside
the original landholders’ lineages.
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Cases
Case 3-1: Acquisition of land rights by the “compani”
In 1951 eleven migrants from Anum and Boso formed a group to pool funds
to acquire land in Bepoase. They purchased the rights to land near the village
by paying money to the Benkyemahene through the paternal grandfather of
the present village head. The acquired land was divided into strips in propor-
tion to each individual’s contribution, and the eleven farmers began cocoa
cultivation on their individual shares of land. Of these eleven migrants, four
were still living at the time of the survey.
Case 3-2: Land acquisition by Nyinahin citizens
Around 1958, Sara, a sixty-year-old woman from Nyinahin, came with the
Nyinahinhene to inspect some land around Nagore. Together with other
Nyinahin citizens who wanted to acquire land there, she was allotted a piece
of land by the Nyinahinhene. She planted some trees on the border of her
share of land to mark the boundary. In acquiring this land, she made no
payment, nor did she engage in ceremonies to confirm the land acquisition or
prepare documents. She has been using this land to produce cocoa and food
crops.
Case 3-3: Procedure for land sales
Ama, a sixty-two-year-old woman in Nagore, purchased a piece of land for
260,000 cedis in 1995, using earnings derived from the cocoa farm her hus-
band gave her in 1981. When purchasing the land, she used a government-
licensed notary to prepare a document certifying the land purchase. She sub-
mitted the document to the Nyinahinhene in the presence of such witnesses as
the notary, her husband as a representative of the buying side, and the seller’s
brother and sister as representatives of the selling side. The seller presented
cash and local gin to the Nyinahinhene, and also gave gin to the witnesses.
Case 3-4: Conflicts over sold land
In 1995 Thomas, a twenty-six-year-old Akuapem-Tutu living in Gyaha,
inherited a piece of land from his paternal grandfather who had purchased it
from somebody. When this someone died, however, one of his sons went to
court to get the land back. Thomas’s grandfather had prepared a document
certifying the purchase, but the selling side insisted that no such document
had been prepared (in fact the document had been hidden by the seller’s son).
However, the seller’s other son revealed the existence of the document and
Thomas won the suit. Thomas later heard that the latter son had been on very
bad terms with his father (the seller).
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Case 3-5: Land transfer to wives and children through a will
The father of Kojo, a forty-five-year-old man in Nagore, prepared a will
before he died in 1992. In this document he divided his land between four
wives and nine children and left nothing to his matrilineal relatives. He did
this because when he was hospitalized, no one from his matrilineal side took
care of him. This angered him, and he recorded their ingratitude in his will so
that no matrilineal kin could file any objections against the way he divided up
and passed on his land.
Case 3-6: Concurrent inheritance of land through matrilineal and patrilineal
lines
The paternal uncle of Asare (a fifty-five-year-old man living in Gyaha who
is a Boso which follows matrilineal inheritance) inherited land from Asare’s
father after the father died. When the uncle died, the land was to be inherited
by Asare’s cousin (the uncle’s sister’s son). However, the nephew agreed to
give part of the land to Asare as the son of the original holder of the land.
Thus, part of the land was inherited through the matrilineal line and part
through the patrilineal line (see Figure 3-2).
Fig. 3-2
= direction of land inheritance.
= landholders who died.
Asare
Patrilineal line
Matrilineal line
Case 3-7: Sale of lineage land by individuals
The father of Ofei (a sixty-five-year-old man living in Gyaha who is a
Akuapem Akropong which follows matrilineal inheritance) purchased a piece
of land from the Abenasehene in 1924. The father died in 1960, and his
brother then managed the land as lineage land. Since the death of the father’s
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brother in 1975, Ofei has managed this lineage land. Before Ofei took over
responsibility for this land, however, one of the uncle’s sons sold part of the
land at his own discretion, despite the fact that it is lineage land. Because of
this, the present size of the land is smaller than before.
Notes
1 Berry (1988a, pp. 53, 67) describes this situation with such expressions as “bundles
of rights in land” and “multiplicity of rights and interests.” The title of this chapter
is drawn from Berry’s terminology.
2 At the time of writing, land title registration under this law had started in big cities
like the capital Accra, but not in rural areas.
3 Critical discussion of this move has been presented by Platteau (1996), Havnevik
(1997), Bruce (1993), Atwood (1990), Barrows and Roth (1990), Cornia (1994),
and Sjaastad and Bromley (1997).
